It was a strange thing. I was on, I was on days, and of course the sit-down came on the night shift at change of shift, at three-thirty.

Right.

You just finished. And there were so few people knew about this, you know, you had to be really one of the select few, and I didn't actually, didn't even know that, I knew that this was going to come about, you know, I knew this was in the cards and so forth, but I didn't know when. I went home that night oblivious to the fact that this was the big day, this was D-Day. I didn't know that.

So you finished your shift and the plant went home?

Yeah, I didn't know about it until I got home.

Later that night you found out that there'd been a sit-down strike?

Yeah, yeah. Two, three hours after I got home they called for some more people on, on... Well, the news came over the radio, of course, then I got a few telephone calls. Hell, we don't know whether these guys are gonna be throwed out or not. We need some help, come on down. So, down we went.

But, this was one of the greatest, you know, the tactic which was involved in taking over plant four was, I think, was taught in schools, even, as one of the greatest tactics. And, of course it would have to be described as a diversionary tactic.

Sure. Same over as plant nine.

This was one of the greatest schemes that was ever developed, probably, in the history of the labor movement. Because it went over without a hitch and here you got all of these people involved, probably of all of these people involved, oh, there were no more than twenty or twenty-five who actually knew what was going to happen.

The master strategy.

That's right, who actually knew what was going to...

Show Transcript Speaker: Larry Jones. Interviewed by U-M Flint Labor History Project. Date of interview: 6-9-1978. Edited by Michael Van Dyke.

Copyright: ©2002 Michigan State University.